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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
substantial damage to the subject matter of the contract. As a term of the
contract, the vendee paid for the premium on the insurance, before the title was
to pass to him. After the vendor had received indemnity from the insurance
company for this loss, the vendee sought to apply the insurance proceeds to the
purchase price remaining unpaid.
The court previously in Brownell v. Board of Education33 decided that a
contract of insurance is personal and does not run with the land. This decision
followed an English decision"0 since superceded by statute in that country.37
The inequities that arose from the holding in Brownell were forseen by the New
York Law Revision Commission,38 but the legislature did not enact the statute
proposed to remedy the situation.
The majority here distinguished the Brownell case from the present situation
by the showing that in that situation it was the vendor who paid for the insurance
and as such the insurance was not part of the res bargained for. No inequity
arose from that decision as the contract called for delivery of the property in as
good a condition as it was in at the time of the contract, and the vendee could
deduct the damages from the purchase price. The Court felt that regardless
of the legal theory they might adopt, a trust fund rationale30 or other theory, in this
situation the insurance has been taken out for the benefit of both vendor and
vendee. The vendee should not have to pay for the insurance premiums and then
have to pay the full purchase price for damaged property. Such an inequitable
situation should not be allowed to exist, despite the dissent's excellent technical
arguments and the legislative failure to amend the law to eliminate this injustice.
The flexibility of the courts has eliminated the inequitable result that would occur
had the dissenters prevailed.
Confract - Measure Of Damages
In Bellizzi v. Huntley Estates40 a construction contract called for a house
with an attached garage substantially at street level. The completed driveway had
a steep grade precluding its safe and convenient use.
The general rule in building contracts is that where the defect is one that
can be cured without undue expense the owner recovers that amount reasonably
required to remedy the defect.4" If the defect is not so remediable, the damages
35. 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1936).
36. Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
37. 15 GEO. V, ch. 20 §47 (1925).
38. 1936 REPORT OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoMMISsIoN, 767.
39. See, Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190, 220 N.Y. Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1927),
aff'd 222 App. Div. 719, 225 N.Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't 1927).
40. 3 N.Y.2d 112, 164 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1957).
41. McKegney v. Illinois Surety Co., 180 App. Div. 507, 167 N.Y. Supp. 843
Ust Dep't 1917); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1363, p. 3825 (rev. ed. 1937).
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are based on the difference between the value of the defective structure and that
of the structure if properly completed.4 2 This is the theory of substantial
performance coupled with good faith, and is well established in this state.43 The
later rule is applied only where the "cost of completion is grossly and unfairly
out of proportion to the good to be obtained."44  It is necessary to consider
whether the defective building is substantially and safely usable, and the amount
of cost necessary to bring the structure into conformity with the contract. 5
The trial court charged the jury that "the fair and reasonable cost to remedy
the defect ...or to get a reasonably usable driveway" was the proper measure
of damages. The Appellate Division held it error for the lower court to exclude
evidence of "comparative value" rule where the cost to repair would exceed such
difference.40 Reinstating the jury verdict for plaintiff the Court of Appeals
restricted the "difference of value" rule to cases of gross disproportion, amounting
to economic waste if the general rule were applied.
It appears that the proof in the record did show substantial loss of service of
the driveway, and a reasonable possibility of correction and thus an ideal situation
for the application of the general rule.
Rescission - Fraud In The Inception
Ordinarily mere promises of action to be taken in the future are not
actionable in New York on a misrepresentation theory.47 However, it is generally
accepted in this state that a promise which is made with a preconceived intention
of nonperformance amounts to a misrepresentation of fact which may become
the basis for an action in recission.48
In Sabo v. Delman,4" defendant allegedly represented to plaintiff that he
would manufacture and sell certain machinery which plaintiff had patented if
the latter would assign the patents to him in return for, among other things,
25% of the profits. The complaint demanded recission of the agreement. It was
alleged that plaintiff was induced to sign by defendant's promises to manufacture
his product and that these promises were made by the defendant with knowledge
42. Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
43. Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 173 (1858); Spence v. Ham, 163 N.Y. 220, 57 N.E.
412 (1900); Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, supra note 42.
44. Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, supra note 42.
45. High Quality Homes v. Parker, 283 App. Div. 954, 130 N.Y. Supp. 360
(2d Dep't 1954).
46. Bellizzi v. Huntley Estates, 1 A.D.2d 683, 147 N.Y.S.2d 74 (2d Dep't 1955).
47. Adams v. Clark, 239 N.Y. 403, 146 N.E. 462 (1925).
48. See, eg. Adams v. Gillig, 199 N.Y. 314, 92 N.E. 670 (1910).
49. 3 N.Y.2d 163, 164 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1957).
